高管纵向兼任对企业ESG表现的影响研究

Research on the Impact of Vertical Concurrent Appointment of Executives on Corporate ESG Performance

摘要: 在“双碳”目标推进、ESG理念融入资本市场的背景下，ESG已成为衡量企业高质量发展的核心标尺，而公司治理则是决定ESG实践深度的关键变量。高管纵向兼任是我国集团化上市公司的普遍治理安排，兼具协同监督与利益输送双重属性，但其对ESG这类长期非财务绩效的作用逻辑尚未得到系统阐释。文章依托双重代理理论与制度同构理论，从资源挤占、策略扭曲、效率损耗三个维度拆解高管纵向兼任抑制企业ESG表现的传导路径，指出治理边界模糊等四大现实挑战，提出规范兼任管理、完善治理机制、提升披露质量、健全监管体系、推动差异化创新五方面优化路径，为优化集团治理、夯实企业可持续发展根基提供理论参考与实践路径。

Abstract: Against the backdrop of advancing the “dual carbon” goal and the integration of ESG concepts into the capital market, ESG has become a core benchmark for measuring high-quality corporate development, while corporate governance is the key variable determining the depth of ESG practices. Vertical concurrent appointment of executives is a prevalent governance arrangement for group listed companies in China, with dual attributes of collaborative supervision and interest transfer. However, its functional logic for long-term non-financial performance, such as ESG, has not been systematically clarified. Grounded in the dual agency theory and institutional isomorphism theory, this paper dissects the transmission paths through which vertical concurrent appointment of executives suppresses corporate ESG performance from three dimensions: resource crowding-out, strategic distortion, and efficiency loss. It identifies four major practical challenges, including ambiguous governance boundaries, and puts forward optimization approaches from five aspects: standardizing the management of concurrent appointments, improving internal governance mechanisms, enhancing information disclosure quality, perfecting the regulatory system, and promoting differentiated innovation. The findings provide theoretical references and practical guidance for optimizing group governance and consolidating the foundation of corporate sustainable development.