企业内部薪酬差距与创新关系研究

Research on the Relationship between Internal Salary Gap within the Enterprise and Innovation

摘要: 为了对企业内部薪酬差距与创新的关系进行详细研究，本文引入了人力资本理论、锦标赛理论及公平理论、社会比较理论分析了企业内部薪酬差异对创新的影响。通过委托代理理论、风险规避假说以及不同产权制度下晋升文化、市场机制的分析得出了本文两大假设。研究发现，传统的委托代理关系难免导致代理冲突，因此股东会利用薪酬设计缓解双方代理冲突，通过提高企业内部薪酬差距能够激励管理层提高工作积极性，主动投资创新型项目，从而提高企业创新水平。加入锦标赛理论、公平理论以及社会比较理论后，研究结论仍成立。此外，相比于国有企业，非国有企业中企业内部薪酬差异对创新的影响效果较为显著。两大结论的发现，对国家实现高质量发展、建设创新型国家以及在国有企业中更好平衡限薪令政策都有新的启示和反思。

Abstract: In order to conduct a detailed study on the relationship between internal salary gap and innovation in enterprises, this article introduces human capital theory, tournament theory, equity theory, and social comparison theory to analyze the impact of internal salary gap on innovation. Through the analysis of agency theory, risk aversion hypothesis, and promotion culture and market mechanisms under different property rights systems, two major hypotheses have been derived in this article. Research has found that traditional principal-agent relationships inevitably lead to agency conflicts. Therefore, shareholders will use compensation design to alleviate agency conflicts between the two parties. By increasing the internal salary gap within the enterprise, it can motivate management to improve their work enthusiasm, actively invest in innovative projects, and thus enhance the level of enterprise innovation. After incorporating tournament theory, equity theory, and social comparison theory, the research conclusion still holds true. In addition, compared to state-owned enterprises, the impact of internal salary differences on innovation is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises. The discovery of two major conclusions provides new insights and reflections for the country to achieve high-quality development, build an innovative country, and better balance salary restriction policies in state-owned enterprises.