罗尔斯公平与效率道德基础的建构逻辑
The Constructive Logic of Rawls’s Moral Foundation for Fairness and Efficiency
摘要: 在现代社会正义理论的论争中,公平与效率的关系重构始终是核心议题。罗尔斯在《正义论》中通过“原初状态”与“无知之幕”的思想实验,突破了古典功利主义将公平依附于效率的理论困境,构建了“公平的正义”理论体系。该理论以“人是目的”为终极道德依据,依托“原初状态”与“无知之幕”的伦理论证,建构起了公平与效率的道德基础,并通过与功利主义、诺齐克主义等流派的对比,确立了“公平优先于效率”的价值排序,为效率划定了明确的道德边界。不过,在诺齐克等当代思想家的攻击中,公平优先于效率的当代合法性意义,需要持续深入体悟。总之,罗尔斯《正义论》的建构逻辑是当代自由主义对时代问题的最有力回应,当代的所有公平正义秩序的建立,都必须尊重这点。
Abstract: Within the ongoing debates on justice theory in modern society, the reconfiguration of the relationship between fairness and efficiency has consistently remained a central issue. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls employs thought experiments based on the “original position” and the “veil of ignorance” to overcome the theoretical dilemma inherent in classical utilitarianism, where fairness was subordinated to efficiency, and thereby constructs a theoretical framework of “justice as fairness.” This theory takes the premise that “the individual is an end” as its ultimate moral foundation; relying on the ethical reasoning derived from the “original position” and the “veil of ignorance,” it establishes a moral basis for both fairness and efficiency. Furthermore, by contrasting this approach with schools such as utilitarianism and libertarianism, it establishes a value hierarchy wherein “fairness takes precedence over efficiency,” thereby delineating clear moral boundaries for efficiency. However, in response to critiques from contemporary thinkers such as Rawls’ opponents within the liberal tradition, the contemporary legitimacy of prioritizing fairness over efficiency requires continued and profound reflection. In summary, the constructive logic underlying Rawls’s A Theory of Justice represents the most robust response by the mainstream contemporary liberalism to the pressing questions of our era; the establishment of any contemporary order of fairness and justice must necessarily respect this principle.
文章引用:马丹阳. 罗尔斯公平与效率道德基础的建构逻辑[J]. 哲学进展, 2026, 15(9): 75-81. https://doi.org/10.12677/acpp.2026.159422

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