贝克莱《视觉新论》具备何种意义上的具身性？

In What Sense Does Berkeley’s An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision Embody Embodiment?

摘要: 既有研究常因《视觉新论》借眼动、身体位移和触觉经验说明视觉空间，将贝克莱视为具身认知先驱。问题在于，身体对知觉的参与究竟是能力形成的历史条件，还是进入知觉内容与实现机制。文章据此区分发生–习得性依赖、内容–意义构成和过程–系统构成。文本证据表明，贝克莱明确承认空间能力的身体学习史，也允许将可能行动及其感觉后果理解为间接空间所指的部分规定条件。但是，其行动关系不构成光、色等本义视觉内容，成熟知觉也不以实时身体–环境耦合为必要机制。身体在其本体论中仍是被动观念复合体，知觉秩序最终依赖主动精神与神学视觉语言。因此，《视觉新论》呈现的是一种分层且有限的具身性。

Abstract: Berkeley’s An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision is often treated as an anticipation of embodied cognition because it explains spatial perception through ocular movement, bodily locomotion, tactile experience, and acquired association. Yet bodily participation does not by itself establish constitutive embodiment. This article distinguishes developmental-acquisitional dependence, content-semantic constitution, and process-systemic constitution. Berkeley clearly supports the first and, in a restricted sense, the second: possible actions and their tactile consequences partly individuate the indirect spatial content signified by visual cues, but not the proper visual content of light and color. Nor does Berkeley explain mature perception as realized by real-time body-environment coupling. Since the body remains a complex of passive ideas and perceptual order ultimately depends on active spirit and the divine visual language, his theory exhibits a stratified but limited form of embodiment.