行政协议履行中公益损害的民法矫正机制

Civil Law Remedial Mechanism for Public Interest Damages in the Performance of Administrative Contracts

摘要: 《行政诉讼法》第75条的审查对象仅限于缔约阶段的协议效力，并未对缔约后的履行行为设置效力审查机制。行政协议被认定为有效后，相对人的履行行为仍然具有损害公共利益的可能，由此产生“协议有效但履行违法”的规范盲点。周口案中，法院确认行政机关招标行为违法，出于公共利益考量并未撤销协议，相对人取得独家经营权后的履行行为可能形成市场垄断，法院却无从下手进行干预。本文以《民法典》第153条为核心，将民法对违法行为的效力否定机制引入到行政协议履行领域，并衔接行政机关的矫正职责，形成公私法融合的公共利益保护闭环。

Abstract: Article 75 of the Administrative Procedure Law confines its review to the validity of administrative contracts at the contracting stage, without establishing any validity review mechanism for post‑contractual performance conduct. Once an administrative contract is upheld as valid, the counterparty’s performance may still give rise to public interest harm, thus creating a normative blind spot characterized by “a valid contract coupled with unlawful performance”. In the Zhoukou Case, the court confirmed that the administrative authority’s tendering act was unlawful, yet declined to revoke the contract on public interest grounds. After the counterparty obtained an exclusive operating right, its subsequent performance could lead to market monopoly, but the court lacked any legal instrument to intervene. Taking Article 153 of the Civil Code as the core, this article introduces the civil law mechanism for nullifying unlawful juridical acts into the sphere of administrative contract performance, and aligns it with the administrative authority’s corrective duties, thereby forming a closed‑loop public interest protection framework through the integration of public and private law.