考虑区块链的农业供应链金融运营优化决策研究

Blockchain-Enabled Operational Optimization for Agricultural Supply Chain Finance

摘要: 信息不对称导致消费者信任不足和农户恶意违约，影响了农业供应链金融参与主体的决策。为此，本文从管理工程系统建模与优化决策视角出发，基于Stackelberg博弈理论，构建由电商平台与资金约束农户组成的农业供应链金融决策模型，对比分析有无区块链两种情形下电商平台和农户的最优决策，并进一步开展贷款利率和区块链应用成本的灵敏度分析。研究发现，无论是否引入区块链，电商平台和农户的最优决策均与贷款利率呈正相关。有区块链情形下，随着区块链应用成本的递增，电商平台的最优决策呈负相关，而农户的最优决策呈正相关。本文揭示了区块链技术通过信息共享与智能合约机制影响供应链金融决策的内在逻辑，为农业供应链金融参与主体的系统化决策与运营管理提供参考。

Abstract: Information asymmetry leads to insufficient consumer trust and opportunistic default by farmers, which affects the decision-making of participating entities in agricultural supply chain finance. To address this issue, from the perspective of management engineering system modeling and operational optimization, this paper constructs a decision model for agricultural supply chain finance consisting of an e-commerce platform and a capital-constrained farmer based on Stackelberg game theory. It compares and analyzes the optimal decisions of both parties under scenarios with and without blockchain, and further conducts sensitivity analyses on the loan interest rate and the cost of blockchain application. The findings reveal that, regardless of blockchain adoption, the optimal decisions of both the e-commerce platform and the farmer are positively correlated with the loan interest rate. In the presence of blockchain, as the application cost increases, the platform’s optimal decision shows a negative correlation, while the farmer’s optimal decision shows a positive correlation. This paper elucidates the underlying logic by which blockchain technology influences supply chain finance decisions through information sharing and smart contract mechanisms, providing reference for systematic decision-making and operational management of participants in agricultural supply chain finance.