考虑市场竞争的新能源汽车换电服务营销模式选择研究
Research on the Selection of Battery Swap Service Marketing Modes for New Energy Vehicles Considering Market Competition
摘要: 本文针对由电池供应商、两家新能源汽车制造商及第三方换电服务商构成的竞争性供应链,研究跟随者制造商M2在换电服务营销模式上的策略选择问题。通过构建M2可采取自营模式或授权模式的两阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,分析市场竞争、服务营销能力与成本结构对模式选择的影响机理。研究发现:第三方服务商(TSP)的服务营销效率需超越某一临界值,授权模式才可能提升M2利润;该临界值受M2自营成本、授权费率及服务竞争强度共同影响,形成清晰的“决策域”。数值仿真表明,在服务体验竞争激烈的市场环境中,即使TSP的效率优势不显著,授权模式仍可能因快速提升用户服务水平而具备战略价值。本研究为企业换电服务营销模式选择提供了基于效率评估、成本权衡与市场竞争动态分析的决策框架。
Abstract: This paper investigates the strategic choice of battery-swapping service marketing model for a follower manufacturer (M2) within a competitive supply chain consisting of a battery supplier, two new energy vehicle manufacturers, and a third-party battery-swapping service provider. A two-stage Stackelberg game model is constructed to compare two alternative models available to M2: the self-operated model and the licensing model. The analysis focuses on how market competition, service marketing efficiency, and cost structure influence the model selection mechanism. The findings reveal that the licensing model can enhance M2’s profit only when the service marketing efficiency of the third-party service provider (TSP) exceeds a critical threshold. This threshold is jointly determined by M2’s self-operation cost, the licensing fee rate, and the intensity of service competition, thereby forming a well-defined “decision region”. Numerical simulations further demonstrate that in markets characterized by intense service competition, the licensing model may still offer strategic value even when the TSP’s efficiency advantage is relatively modest, owing to its ability to rapidly improve user service levels. This study provides firms with a decision-making framework for selecting battery-swapping service marketing models, grounded in efficiency assessment, cost trade-offs, and dynamic analysis of market competition.
文章引用:封瑀. 考虑市场竞争的新能源汽车换电服务营销模式选择研究[J]. 电子商务评论, 2026, 15(9): 119-127. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2026.159977

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