政府补贴与低碳偏好下动力电池回收工程闭环供应链博弈决策与优化研究

Research on Game Decision and Optimization of Closed Loop Supply Chain for Power Battery Recycling Engineering under Government Subsidies and Low Carbon Preferences

摘要: 在消费者低碳偏好日益增强、供应链管理决策优化需求凸显的背景下，基于博弈决策理论构建电池制造商(模型M)、电池零售商(模型R)和第三方回收商(模型T)分别作为回收主体的动力电池回收工程闭环供应链模型，探究政府补贴、消费者低碳偏好双重因素对供应链运营决策及效益的影响。研究表明：(1) 不同回收决策模型中，供应链整体碳排放、制造商碳减排投资水平以及回收努力程度都随消费者低碳偏好的增加而提升；(2) 政府补贴与消费者低碳偏好共同调控供应链决策模型选择及利润表现，在消费者低碳偏好较低及中等区间，政府补贴提升可显著助推制造商回收模型利润增长，该场景下最优决策为选取制造商回收模式；在消费者低碳偏好较高区间，无论政府补贴如何调整，第三方回收模型的供应链整体利润均显著优于其他模型，为最优管理决策方案。

Abstract: Against the backdrop of growing consumer low-carbon preferences and prominent demands for optimization of supply chain management decisions, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain models of power battery recycling project with battery manufacturers (Model M), battery retailers (Model R) and third-party recyclers (Model T) serving as recycling entities respectively based on game decision theory. It explores the impacts of two factors, namely government subsidies and consumer low-carbon preferences, on the operational decisions and benefits of the supply chain. The results show that: (1) In different recycling decision models, the overall carbon emissions of the supply chain, manufacturers’ carbon emission reduction investment level and recycling effort all rise with the increase in consumer low-carbon preferences; (2) Government subsidies and consumer low-carbon preferences jointly regulate the selection of supply chain decision models and profit performance. When consumer low-carbon preferences are at low and medium levels, the increase of government subsidies can significantly boost the profit of the manufacturer-led recycling model, making this recycling mode the optimal choice. When consumer low-carbon preferences are high, the overall supply chain profit of the third-party recycling model is significantly higher than that of other models regardless of changes in government subsidies, which serves as the optimal management decision scheme.