考虑制造商竞争的平台销售模式均衡决策研究

Equilibrium Decision-Making of Platform Sales Strategies under Manufacturer Competition

摘要: 在平台经济快速发展与制造商渠道竞争日趋激烈的现实背景下，针对一方自建平台直销、另一方依托第三方平台合作的不对称竞争供应链，本文构建由两个替代制造商与一个电商平台组成的Stackelberg博弈模型，分别求解转售、寄售、混合三种销售模式下的均衡价格、批发价格与成员最优利润，并开展潜在市场规模、渠道弹性、佣金费率的单因素敏感性分析。研究结果表明：制造商B的均衡决策受关键参数显著驱动，转售模式利润稳定但定价权受限，寄售模式灵活但对佣金敏感，混合模式在竞争加剧环境下更具优势；潜在市场规模扩大有利于直销制造商而挤压合作制造商利润，渠道弹性提升可通过“以量补价”提升整体供应链收益，佣金费率则对寄售与混合模式产生非线性影响并存在明显阈值效应。本文完善了竞争场景下平台销售模式的均衡理论，可为制造商渠道策略选择与电商平台佣金机制设计提供决策参考。

Abstract: Against the practical backdrop of the rapid development of the platform economy and increasingly fierce channel competition among manufacturers, this paper considers an asymmetric competitive supply chain in which one manufacturer builds its own direct-selling platform while the other relies on cooperation with a third-party platform. A Stackelberg game model consisting of two competing substitute manufacturers and one e-commerce platform is constructed. The equilibrium prices, wholesale prices, and optimal profits of supply chain members are derived separately under three sales modes: reselling, consignment, and hybrid. Furthermore, single-factor sensitivity analyses are conducted with respect to potential market size, channel elasticity, and commission rate. The results show that the equilibrium decisions of Manufacturer B are significantly driven by key parameters. The reselling mode yields stable profits but restricts pricing power; the consignment mode is flexible yet sensitive to the commission rate; and the hybrid mode is more advantageous in an environment of intensified competition. An expansion of potential market size benefits the direct-selling manufacturer but squeezes the profits of the cooperative manufacturer. An improvement in channel elasticity can enhance the overall supply chain revenue through “volume compensating for price”. The commission rate exerts a nonlinear effect on both consignment and hybrid modes with an obvious threshold effect. This paper enriches the equilibrium theory of platform sales modes in competitive scenarios and provides decision-making references for manufacturers in channel strategy selection and for e-commerce platforms in commission mechanism design.