机构投资者与上市公司非效率投资——基于机构投资者持股与调研的双重网络研究

Institutional Investors and Corporate Investment Inefficiency—A Dual-Network Study Based on Institutional Shareholding and Site Visits

摘要: 本文以2012~2024年深交所A股上市公司为研究对象，基于社会网络分析方法，构建机构投资者共同持股网络与联合调研网络，实证检验双重网络特征向量中心性对企业非效率投资的影响。研究发现：第一，持股网络与调研网络特征向量中心性的提高均显著加剧了企业非效率投资；第二，进一步分析表明，滞后一期的双重网络交互项对企业非效率投资具有显著正向影响，且主要体现在过度投资方面；第三，异质性分析发现，双重网络对非效率投资的影响在网络边缘企业中更为显著。本文突破单一网络分析模式，构建“持股–调研”双重网络框架，揭示了机构投资者网络化行为潜在的治理风险，为监管部门防范机构投资者网络风险、企业优化投资者结构提供了理论依据与实证参考。

Abstract: Taking Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2024 as the research sample, this paper employs social network analysis to construct dual networks of institutional investors’ common shareholding and joint site visits, and examines the impact of eigenvector centrality on corporate investment inefficiency. The findings show that higher eigenvector centrality in both networks significantly exacerbates investment inefficiency. Further analysis reveals that the lagged interaction term between the two networks has a significant positive effect, primarily manifested in overinvestment, and this effect is more pronounced among firms at the network edge. By constructing a “shareholding-site visit” dual-network framework, this paper reveals the governance risks of institutional investors’ networked behaviors, providing theoretical and empirical insights for regulators and firms.