《范畴篇》对“存在与思维同一”问题的处理

On the Treatment of the Issue of “The Identity of Being and Thinking” in the Categories

摘要: 《范畴篇》从谓述关系分析着手为存在分类，暗含着对巴门尼德遗留下来的问题——“存在与思维同一”如何可能的处理。相较于亚里士多德后期成熟的“形式–质料”学说，《范畴篇》展现出这一脉络：将第一实体作为根本的范畴，使之具有本体论的意义，以第一实体作为处理“存在与思维同一”问题的出发点，使其兼具存在的确定性和思维对象的可变属性从而实现存在与思维二者同一。然而第一实体在感觉经验上的变化和其本质上确定性的来源都未被阐清，因而对“存在与思维同一”问题的处理并没有完成。

Abstract: The Categories begins with an analysis of predicative relations to classify being, implicitly addressing the issue left by Parmenides—how “being and thinking are identical” is possible. Compared to Aristotle’s later mature doctrine of “form-matter,” the Categories reveals a line of thought: taking primary substances as fundamental categories endowed with ontological significance, and using them as the starting point for resolving the problem of “being and thinking as one,” thereby combining the determinacy of being with the variability of objects of thought, thus achieving identity between being and thinking. However, neither the changes of primary substances in sensory experience nor the source of their essential determinacy is clarified, leaving the treatment of the problem of “being and thinking as one” incomplete.