剑河钩藤电商佣金分配机制的三方演化博弈
A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of E-Commerce Commission Distribution Mechanism for Jianhe Uncaria rhynchophylla
摘要: 在剑河钩藤电商化过程中,平台佣金设定、商家质量投入与消费者购买行为存在动态利益冲突。文章构建了三方演化博弈模型,在统一货币等价收益框架下,分析低佣金率、高质量成本、补贴强度及消费者偏好对系统协同演化的影响,并基于Python进行数值仿真。研究发现:基准情形下系统可收敛于“低佣金–高质量–高购买”的均衡状态。低佣金率过低会使平台失去维持低佣金策略的动力,当提至约0.10时三方更易协同;高质量成本升至3.20~3.50区间时,系统将失稳并滑向低质量状态;补贴强度达0.70及以上、消费者质量偏好提至1.00及以上时,系统方能跨越启动门槛实现稳定收敛。研究表明,剑河钩藤电商协同的关键在于通过适度佣金、成本控制、政策启动与需求培育形成正反馈。文章为道地中药材电商定价与质量治理提供了量化参考。
Abstract: During the e-commerce transformation of Jianhe Uncaria rhynchophylla (Gouteng), there exist dynamic conflicts of interest among platform commission setting, merchant quality investment, and consumer purchasing behavior. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the impacts of low commission rate, high-quality cost, subsidy intensity, and consumer preference on the system’s co-evolution under a unified monetary equivalent payoff framework, and conducts numerical simulations based on Python. The results show that the system can converge to the “low commission - high quality - high purchase” equilibrium state in the baseline scenario. Excessively low commission rates will deprive platforms of the incentive to maintain low commission strategies, and tripartite synergy is more likely to be achieved when the commission rate is raised to approximately 0.10. When the high-quality cost rises to the range of 3.20~3.50, the system will become unstable and degenerate into a low-quality state. Only when the subsidy intensity reaches 0.70 or above and consumers’ quality preference is raised to 1.00 or above can the system cross the start-up threshold and achieve stable convergence. The study indicates that the key to the e-commerce synergy of Jianhe Uncaria rhynchophylla lies in forming a positive feedback loop through moderate commission rates, cost control, policy initiation, and demand cultivation. This paper provides a quantitative reference for the e-commerce pricing and quality governance of authentic Chinese medicinal materials.
参考文献
|
[1]
|
商务部: 2025年农村网络零售额首次突破3万亿元[EB/OL]. https://news.cctv.cn/2026/02/05/ARTISqvyJpGnGizNpGt62sD2260205.shtml, 2026-02-05.
|
|
[2]
|
深山“药”力绘宏图 全链跃迁启新程——贵州省剑河县中药材产业高质量发展综述[EB/OL]. http://gz.people.com.cn/n2/2026/0204/c383886-41493169.html, 2026-02-04.
|
|
[3]
|
贵州剑河: 生态赋能产业走出“两山”转化新路径[EB/OL]. https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20260108A01BE100, 2026-01-08.
|
|
[4]
|
陈爽. 电商平台自有品牌质量水平与制造商渠道演化博弈研究[J]. 电子商务评论, 2025, 14(3): 1519-1533.
|
|
[5]
|
黄晓琼, 徐飞. 聚合模式下双边平台的增值服务投资及佣金定价策略研究[J]. 管理学报, 2024, 21(6): 919-927.
|
|
[6]
|
刘峥. 困境与突破: 中药材供应链创新发展研究[J]. 中草药, 2017, 48(19): 4126-4132.
|
|
[7]
|
张芳, 张经纬. 考虑物流时效的电商农产品供应链演化博弈研究[J]. 计算机工程与应用, 2024, 60(19): 323-333.
|
|
[8]
|
Weibull, J.W. (1997) Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press.
|
|
[9]
|
刘德民, 随力瑞, 卢颖. 电商平台反“搭便车”三方演化博弈研究[J]. 价格理论与实践, 2022(12): 137-140, 202.
|
|
[10]
|
邹轶, 厉小军. 基于电商平台监管的预售三方演化博弈研究[J]. 商业经济与管理, 2023, 43(8): 18-26.
|
|
[11]
|
陈智, 王莹. 基于随机演化博弈的农产品电子商务投资困境解决路径[J]. 中国流通经济, 2024, 38(7): 101-114.
|
|
[12]
|
Friedman, D. (1991) Evolutionary Games in Economics. Econometrica, 59, 637-666. https://doi.org/10.2307/2938222
|
|
[13]
|
宿昊. 电商平台数字赋能下制造商渠道选择博弈研究[J]. 全国流通经济, 2024(1): 92-96.
|