作为道德情感的冷暖感

The Sense of Warmth and Coolness as Moral Sentiment

摘要: 将道德情感视为道德判断的基础，是情感主义一贯的传统。从近代沙夫茨伯里、哈奇森到休谟和斯密，近代道德情感主义者虽然对于道德感的来源及其作用机制存在不同理解，却都试图说明，人们对于行为善或恶的分辨建立在情感感受之上。当代情感主义者斯洛特继承了这一基本思路，将在移情基础之上的冷暖感作为基础性的道德情感。然而，作为对近代苦乐感模式的移情化发展，冷暖感依旧未能完全化解道德情感理论面临的困境。

Abstract: To take moral sentiments as the foundation of moral judgment represents a long-standing tradition of sentimentalism. From early-modern thinkers Shaftesbury and Hutcheson to Hume and Smith, modern moral sentimentalists, notwithstanding their divergent interpretations of the origin and mechanism of the moral sense, all sought to show that human discrimination between the goodness and evil of actions is grounded in affective feelings. Michael Slote, a contemporary sentimentalist, inherits this fundamental line of thought and regards empathy-based the sense of warmth and coolness as the basic form of moral sentiments. Nevertheless, as an empathy-informed development of the early-modern pleasure-pain feeling model, the sense of warmth and coolness still fail to fully resolve the dilemmas confronting moral sentimentalist theory.