基于康德“说谎难题”的法权视角义务观

The Duty View from the Perspective of Right in Kant’s “Lie Dilemma”

摘要: 本文从法权哲学的义务观视角出发，为康德在“说谎难题”中禁止说谎的立场提供辩护。文章指出，康德对诚实义务的绝对坚持并非道德教条主义，而是基于对法权原则之先验性与形式性的根本维护。通过厘清法权与德性领域的差异，明确在先验契约下法权义务的绝对性，此外相较于公意，法权的规范性更能成为稳固公民社会秩序的基石。最终表明，康德的“严苛”既是体现了对法权共同体之理性基础的维护，也是对人作为目的本身这一原则的最高表达。

Abstract: This paper defends Kant’s position of prohibiting lying in the “Lie Dilemma” from the perspective of the view of duty in the philosophy of right. It argues that Kant’s uncompromising adherence to the duty of truthfulness is not moral dogmatism, but a fundamental defense of the apriority and formality of the principle of right. By clarifying the distinction between the domains of right and morality, this paper identifies the absoluteness of duties of right under the a priori contract. Moreover, compared with the general will, the normativity of right serves as a more solid cornerstone for the order of civil society. It ultimately demonstrates that Kant’s “austerity” embodies both the preservation of the rational foundation of the juridical community and the supreme expression of the principle that humanity is an end in itself.