信息不对称下双渠道农产品供应链绿色技术专利许可合同设计

Design of Green Technology Patent Licensing Contract for Dual-Channel Agricultural Supply Chain under Information Asymmetry

摘要: 本文针对双渠道农产品供应链中因市场规模信息非对称及涉农企业绿色技术投入决策不确定性引发的合同设计难题，构建动态博弈模型，研究专利技术供应商的最优许可合同设计逻辑，以及涉农企业的双渠道定价与绿色技术投入策略。研究发现：信息非对称下专利技术供应商会策略性地设计固定收费与双重收费形式的合同菜单以有效甄别市场信息，而信息对称下仅会设计固定收费形式以实现利润最大化，且信息非对称会损害专利技术供应商利润。无论信息是否对称、是否投入绿色技术，涉农企业均会实施双渠道差异化定价策略，且定价机制相同；涉农企业绿色技术投入决策虽不改变最优合同形式，却能显著提升供应链各主体利润水平，并有效增进消费者剩余与社会福利。

Abstract: This paper tackles contractual design challenges in dual-channel agricultural supply chains, which stem from information asymmetry regarding market size and uncertainties surrounding the agribusiness’s green technology investment decisions. By constructing a dynamic game model, it examines the optimal logic for designing licensing contracts for the patent technology supplier, as well as the dual-channel pricing strategies and green technology investment decisions of the agribusiness. Findings show that under information asymmetry, the supplier strategically designs fixed-fee contract or two-part tariff contract to effectively identify market information. Under symmetric information, only fixed-fee contract is designed to maximize profits. Moreover, information asymmetry will harm the profits of patent technology suppliers. Regardless of information symmetry or green technology investment, the agribusiness implements a dual-channel differentiated pricing strategy with consistency in its mechanism. Although the agribusiness’s green technology investment does not alter the optimal contract form, it significantly enhances the profit levels of all supply chain entities and effectively increases both consumer surplus and social welfare.