政府规制下电商平台售假治理与商家售假行为的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of E-Commerce Platforms’ Governance of Counterfeit Sales and Merchants’ Counterfeiting Behavior under Government Regulation

摘要: 当前，市场信任已成为制约数字经济可持续发展的重要因素，探讨政府规制下电商平台与商家诚信经营策略演化，有助于政府科学调控网络交易市场秩序。研究构建了政府–平台–商家三方演化博弈模型，探究政府规制措施、正面行为收益增长率及成本、“搭便车”行为对平台治理与商家诚信策略的影响，并用数值仿真对结论进行佐证。结果表明，合理力度的政府规制能够有效促进平台与商家采取正面行为；原始收益及正面行为收益增长率的提升有利于实现诚信经营；平台治理与商家诚信经营成本及“搭便车”收益的增加会降低平台与商家诚信经营的意愿。

Abstract: Currently, market trust has become a key constraint on the sustainable development of the digital economy. Exploring the evolution of honest business strategies of e-commerce platforms and merchants under government regulation can help the government scientifically regulate the order of the online trading market. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, platforms, and merchants, and examines the effects of regulatory measures, return growth rates and costs of positive behavior, and free-riding on platform governance and merchant integrity strategies, using numerical simulations. The results indicate that appropriately intensive government regulation effectively promotes positive behavior by platforms and merchants; higher initial returns and return growth rates from positive behavior encourage honest operations; whereas increased governance costs, costs of honest operations, and free-riding benefits reduce their willingness to act with integrity.