养老保险全国统筹下中央调剂金对地方征缴激励的影响研究

A Study on the Influence of Central Adjustment Fund on Local Collection Incentives under the National Coordination of Endowment Insurance

摘要: 企业职工基本养老保险全国统筹是我国应对人口老龄化、促进社会公平的重大制度变革。中央调剂金制度作为实现全国统筹的关键过渡机制，在有效平衡地区间基金余缺、彰显制度公平性的同时，其潜在的激励不相容问题也逐渐凸显。统筹层次的提高导致了征缴主体“事权”与“财权”的分离，可能对地方政府的保费征缴积极性产生抑制，形成“缴”与“等”的行为博弈，其根源在于制度设计中的信息不对称与目标冲突。本文通过构建“基金净贡献–净受益”地区的对比分析框架，并引入地方政府异质性与中央政府多重目标约束，深化了对该问题的理论阐释。为此，本文提出，构建激励相容的长效机制，需要从优化调剂金参数、改革征缴体制、协同推进参量改革及引入精算平衡等多维度进行系统设计，以引导地方政府行为与养老保险制度长期可持续发展的宏观目标相一致。

Abstract: The national coordination of basic endowment insurance for enterprise employees is a major institutional reform for China to cope with population aging and promote social equity. As a critical transitional mechanism for realizing national coordination, the central adjustment fund system can effectively balance the surplus and deficit of funds among regions and highlight institutional fairness. Meanwhile, the problem of incentive incompatibility has gradually become prominent. The improvement of overall planning level separates administrative power from financial power in premium collection, which may weaken local governments’ enthusiasm for premium collection and give rise to the game behavior between “active collection” and “waiting for adjustment subsidies”. This problem originates from information asymmetry and conflicting institutional objectives between central and local governments. By constructing a comparative analysis framework between “net contributor” and “net beneficiary” regions, and incorporating the heterogeneity of local governments and the multi-objective constraints of the central government, this paper deepens the theoretical explanation of this issue. To construct a long‑term mechanism of incentive compatibility, it is necessary to carry out systematic institutional improvement from optimizing the parameters of adjustment fund, reforming the collection system, promoting coordinated parametric reforms and implementing the principle of actuarial balance, so as to align local governments’ behaviors with the macro goal of long‑term sustainable development of endowment insurance.