社会保险基金预算管理央地责任研究——以统筹职工养老保险为例

A Study on Central-Local Responsibilities in the Budget Management of Social Insurance Funds—A Case Study of Pooled Employee Pension Insurance

摘要: 人口老龄化背景下，我国职工基本养老保险历经多阶段统筹层次提升，于2022年正式迈入全国统筹新阶段，形成“中央负责调剂、地方负责经办”的央地共管模式。在该模式下中央与地方形成多层级委托代理关系，受权责划分边界不够清晰、不同层级政府间信息不对称以及发展目标侧重存在差异等因素影响，预算管理全链条出现责任衔接不畅问题，绩效考核与财政责任分担机制仍有待完善，由此使得部分地区在保费征缴、参保监管、基金支出等实务环节出现管理行为偏移，对职工养老保险基金长期可持续运行与制度公平带来潜在挑战。本文依托委托代理理论与多任务委托代理分析框架，分析全国统筹背景下社会保险基金预算管理的央地责任现实矛盾，结合不同类型省级行政区的异质性实践特征，提出构建渐进式经办机构垂直管理体系、健全协同适配制度机制和硬化预算约束并提升信息透明度的三维优化路径，旨在清晰界定央地权责边界，实现双方管理目标的一致性，为养老保险全国统筹预设目标的长效落地提供制度保障。

Abstract: Against the backdrop of population aging, China’s basic old‑age insurance for employees has undergone multi-stage upgrades in pooling levels and formally entered the new stage of national pooling in 2022, forming a central-local co-governance model in which “the central government is responsible for fund adjustment and local governments are responsible for administration”. Under this model, the central and local governments form multi-level principal-agent relationships. Affected by unclear boundaries in the division of powers and responsibilities, information asymmetry among governments at different levels, and divergent development priorities, the entire chain of budget management suffers from poor responsibility articulation; performance appraisal and fiscal responsibility-sharing mechanisms remain to be improved. Consequently, management behavior in some regions deviates in such practical links as premium collection, enrollment supervision, and fund expenditure, posing potential challenges to the long-term sustainable operation of the employee pension fund and to institutional equity. Drawing on principal-agent theory and the multi-task principal-agent analytical framework, this research analyzes the real contradictions in central-local responsibilities in social insurance fund budget management under national pooling. Combined with the heterogeneous practice characteristics of different types of provincial-level administrative regions, it proposes a three-dimensional optimization path: establishing a gradual vertical management system for handling agencies, improving coordinated and adaptive institutional mechanisms, and hardening budget constraints while enhancing information transparency. This aims to clearly define the boundaries of central-local powers and responsibilities, achieve consistency between the management goals of both parties, and provide institutional safeguards for the long-term realization of the predetermined goals of national pooling of pension insurance.