认知自我信任的限度：对非调和主义的一种实践性批判

The Limits of Epistemic Self-Trust: A Practical Critique of Non-Conciliationism

摘要: 在分歧知识论中，理性回应问题追问：当主体与认知同侪发生信念分歧时，理性要求何种回应？与之相关但未获得充分讨论的是认知信任问题：主体应在何种程度上信赖自身认知官能而非他人官能？本文论证：认知上的自我信任不能为面对同侪分歧时坚持原有判断提供认知理由。认知自我信任在奠基意义上具有基础性，但这一描述事实不能推出主体有资格判定自身官能比他人官能更可靠。本文进一步一种“实践论说明”；认知自我信任是一种非信念性的实践性立场，即对自己认知官能持依赖–肯定态度，并承担相应的实践承诺与校准责任。这一立场可在缺乏可靠性认知理由时凭非认知根据获得有限辩护，但其辩护始终受认知理由约束。同侪分歧正是重要的二阶认知理由，会削弱原初获辩护的自我信任。据此，本人支持一种“校准式调和主义”，即同侪分歧要求主体降低确信、向对方立场显著校准，必要时悬置判断。

Abstract: In the epistemology of disagreement, the question of rational response asks: when a subject disagrees in belief with an epistemic peer, what response does rationality require? A related but insufficiently discussed issue is that of epistemic trust: to what extent should a subject rely on their own cognitive faculties rather than those of others? This paper argues that epistemic self-trust cannot provide an epistemic reason for maintaining one’s original judgment in the face of peer disagreement. Epistemic self-trust is foundational in the order of grounding, but this descriptive fact does not entail that the subject is entitled to judge their own faculties to be more reliable than those of others. The paper further develops a “practical account”: epistemic self-trust is a non-doxastic practical stance—namely, a reliance-affirmation attitude toward one’s own cognitive faculties, along with corresponding practical commitments and calibrational responsibilities. This stance can be given limited justification on non-epistemic grounds when epistemic reasons concerning reliability are lacking, but its justification is always constrained by epistemic reasons. Peer disagreement is precisely an important second-order epistemic reason that weakens originally justified self-trust. Accordingly, I endorse a “calibrationist conciliationism,” according to which peer disagreement requires the subject to lower confidence, significantly calibrate toward the other party’s position, and, when necessary, suspend judgment.