考虑制造商补贴的政企三方联合应急物资储备决策与工程应用研究

Research on Decision-Making and Engineering Application of Government-Enterprise Tripartite Joint Emergency Material Reserve Considering Manufacturer Subsidies

摘要: 针对应急物资三级供应链中供应商原材料储备剩余损失自担导致储备不足问题，本文基于管理工程视角开展契约机制设计，在数量柔性契约框架下，设计制造商对供应商剩余原材料的事后补贴机制，构建政府主导的三级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型；运用逆向归纳法求解三方最优储备决策，并通过数值算例对比有无补贴两种情形的均衡结果。博弈求解结果证明，补贴机制能够同步抬高供应商原材料储备、制造商成品储备规模，降低政府期望应急成本；数值仿真结果显示补贴可以改善供应商期望利润，且补贴作用于制造商期望利润存在阈值效应：仅当制造商灾后原材料采购价低于临界阈值并且补贴强度适中时可达成三方帕累托改进，补贴过高或是灾后原材料采购价高于临界值都会压缩制造商收益。结合应急物资储备工程实际工况，本文验证了上述均衡结果的工程适用性，并提出了相应的补贴参数选取建议。该研究可为政企联合应急储备体系上游供应链契约优化、风险共担机制设计与应急运营决策提供理论参考。

Abstract: To address the problem of insufficient raw material reserves caused by suppliers bearing the residual loss of unused raw materials in a three-tier emergency supply chain, this paper conducts a contract mechanism design from the perspective of management engineering. Within the framework of a quantity flexibility contract, we design an expost subsidy mechanism provided by the manufacturer to compensate the supplier for leftover raw materials, and construct a government-led Stackelberg game model for the three-tier supply chain. The optimal reserve decisions of the three parties are derived using backward induction, and the equilibrium outcomes under scenarios with and without the subsidy are compared through numerical examples. The game-theoretic results demonstrate that the subsidy mechanism can simultaneously increase both the supplier’s raw material reserve and the manufacturer’s finished product reserve, while reducing the government’s expected emergency cost. Numerical simulations reveal that the subsidy can improve the supplier’s expected profit, but its effect on the manufacturer’s expected profit exhibits a threshold effect: a tripartite Pareto improvement can be achieved only when the manufacturer’s post-disaster raw material procurement price is below a critical threshold and the subsidy intensity is moderate. An excessively high subsidy or a post-disaster procurement price above the critical value will reduce the manufacturer’s profit. Combined with the actual working conditions of emergency material reserve engineering, this paper verifies the engineering applicability of the above equilibrium results and puts forward corresponding suggestions for selecting subsidy parameters. This study provides theoretical references for upstream supply chain contract optimization, risk-sharing mechanism design, and emergency operations decisions within the government-enterprise joint reserve system.