信息不对称视角下的电商刷单问题及其营销优化研究
Research on E-Commerce Fake Orders and Marketing Optimization: An Information Asymmetry Perspective
摘要: 电子商务中买卖双方的空间分离加剧了信息不对称,促使平台依赖销量、评价等信号机制以降低消费者的决策风险。然而,刷单行为通过虚构交易和伪造好评制造虚假信号,严重削弱了该信号体系的甄别功能与有效性。文章基于信息不对称理论,分析刷单对电商市场的扭曲效应:虚假信号稀释信息含量,加剧逆向选择,推高决策成本,侵蚀信任基础,形成“信号失灵–优质挤出–效率损失”的恶性循环。对此,从营销优化视角提出重构真实信号体系路径:引入复购率、退货率等多维质量信号以增加伪造成本;通过购买历史可见、异常评价标注等技术强化信息甄别;培育直播、短视频等直观化信息传递方式;优化平台激励机制,使真实信号获得流量回报。研究认为,系统推进营销机制设计,有望推动电商市场从信号失真走向信息透明,实现消费者福利与行业高质量发展。
Abstract: The spatial separation between buyers and sellers in e-commerce exacerbates information asymmetry, and platforms rely on signal mechanisms such as sales volume and reviews to reduce consumer decision-making risks. However, the behavior of Fake Orders creates false signals through fictitious transactions and fabricated positive reviews, undermining the effectiveness of the signaling system. Based on the theory of information asymmetry, this paper analyzes the distorting effects of Fake Orders on e-commerce markets: false signals dilute information content, aggravate adverse selection, increase consumer decision-making costs, and erode the foundation of market trust, forming a vicious cycle of “signal failure - crowding out of high-quality offerings - efficiency loss”. In response, from a marketing optimization perspective, this study proposes pathways to reconstruct a authentic signal system: introducing multi-dimensional quality signals such as repurchase rate and return rate to increase the cost of forgery; enhancing information screening through technologies such as purchase history visibility and abnormal review labeling; cultivating intuitive information transmission methods such as live streaming and short videos; and optimizing platform incentive mechanisms so that authentic signals receive traffic rewards. The research suggests that systematic improvement of marketing mechanism design can help drive e-commerce markets from signal distortion to information transparency, achieving the dual goals of consumer welfare and high-quality industry development.
文章引用:田芬. 信息不对称视角下的电商刷单问题及其营销优化研究[J]. 电子商务评论, 2026, 15(10): 782-789. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2026.15101181

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