论股东失权制度的适用风险和优化路径

On the Applicable Risk and Optimization Path of Shareholders’ Disqualification System

摘要: 2023年《公司法》增加股东失权制度，旨在惩罚未履行出资义务的股东，以没收其股权的方式迫使其积极履行出资义务，但这一制度适用却存在一些潜在风险。这些潜在风险可能表现为：该制度沦为股东逃避出资义务的工具、股东出资填补责任不合理、失权程序的不确定性易引发争议、对债权人利益保护不足等，从而提出一些优化方案的设想，即强化对失权股东的惩罚措施、创新股东责任限制机制、完善程序建设和加强债权人利益保护等，旨在完善股东失权制度，降低制度适用风险，平衡各方利益，实现强化股东出资责任的立法目的。

Abstract: The 2023 Company Law introduced a shareholder disqualification mechanism designed to penalize shareholders who fail to fulfill their capital contribution obligations by confiscating their equity holdings, thereby compelling them to comply. However, the implementation of this mechanism carries potential risks, including its potential use as a tool for shareholders to evade obligations, unreasonable grounds for requiring capital contributions to fulfill liabilities, uncertainties in the disqualification procedures that may trigger disputes, and inadequate protection of creditors’ interests. To address these issues, the paper proposes optimization measures: strengthening penalties for disqualified shareholders, innovating shareholder liability limitation mechanisms, refining procedural frameworks, and enhancing creditor protection. These initiatives aim to improve the shareholder disqualification system, mitigate application risks, balance stakeholder interests, and achieve the legislative objective of reinforcing shareholders’ capital contribution responsibilities.