电商平台“内卷式”价格竞争的生成机制与福利影响——基于平台流量分配规则的理论述评

Generation Mechanism and Welfare Effects of “Involution-Style” Price Competition on E-Commerce Platforms—A Theoretical Review Based on Platform Traffic Allocation Rules

摘要: 在存量竞争加剧的背景下，电商平台“内卷式”价格竞争已从短期市场现象演变为结构性问题。本文以平台流量分配规则为核心，运用产业组织理论对电商平台“内卷式”价格竞争的生成机制与福利影响进行理论述评。研究发现，生成机制表现为“平台侧–商户侧–平台间”三层次传导：平台通过“流量胁迫”将价格与流量挂钩；商户被迫持续降价；平台间补贴博弈形成“双方都补贴”的纳什均衡。福利影响方面，消费者短期获益但长期面临“低价–低质–消费降级”风险；商家福利损失最集中，中小商户尤甚；社会总福利因资源配置扭曲、动态效率下降及产业链负向传导而呈现净损失。“内卷式”竞争不同于正常价格竞争，是平台权力下商户策略空间被压缩的系统性结果。

Abstract: Against the backdrop of intensifying competition in a stagnant market, “involution-style” price competition on e-commerce platforms has evolved from a short-term market phenomenon into a structural issue. Focusing on platform traffic allocation rules and applying industrial organization theory, this paper provides a theoretical review of the generation mechanism and welfare effects of such competition. The findings reveal a three-layer transmission mechanism: at the platform level, “traffic coercion” links price to traffic allocation; at the merchant level, sellers are forced into continuous price cuts; at the inter-platform level, subsidy competition leads to a Nash equilibrium in which both platforms subsidize. In terms of welfare effects, consumers gain in the short run but face long-term risks of a “low price - low quality - consumption downgrade” spiral. Merchants, especially small and medium-sized ones, suffer the most concentrated welfare losses. Total social welfare exhibits a net loss due to distorted resource allocation, impaired dynamic efficiency, and negative chain effects along the industrial chain. “Involution-style” price competition differs from normal price competition and is the systemic result of compressed strategic space for merchants under platform power.