面向工程决策的供应链应收账款质押融资收益共享契约协调研究

Revenue-Sharing Contract Coordination in Supply Chain Accounts Receivable Pledge Financing for Engineering Decision-Making

摘要: 信息不对称与成员分散决策导致供应链应收账款质押融资中的运营决策与融资决策难以有效协同，影响供应链资金配置与整体运营效率。为此，文章从管理工程系统建模与优化决策视角出发，基于Stackelberg博弈理论，构建由零售商、制造商和金融机构组成的供应链应收账款质押融资决策模型，对比分析无契约与收益共享契约两种情形下零售商订货量、制造商批发价格、金融机构应收账款质押率及各主体利润的均衡变化，并进一步分析收益共享系数对供应链运营与融资决策的影响。研究发现，无契约情形下，双重边际效应与信息不对称使订货、定价与质押决策之间相互制约，供应链整体协调水平较低；引入收益共享契约后，通过调整上下游收益分配关系，能够改善制造商定价、零售商订货与金融机构质押决策之间的联动关系。在满足各参与方约束的合理收益共享系数区间内，供应链成员利润与整体绩效得到改善。进一步考虑契约实施中的信息核验、监督成本、违约责任和参数调整等问题，研究表明，收益共享契约能够通过利益协调机制促进运营决策与融资决策协同，为供应链应收账款质押融资的运营管理与优化决策提供参考。

Abstract: Information asymmetry and decentralized decision-making may hinder the coordination of operational and financing decisions in supply chain accounts receivable pledge financing, thereby reducing financing efficiency and overall supply chain performance. From the perspective of management engineering, this study develops a systematic decision-making framework based on Stackelberg game theory for a supply chain consisting of a retailer, a manufacturer, and a financial institution. Two scenarios, namely, no contractual coordination and coordination through a revenue-sharing contract, are compared in terms of the retailer’s order quantity, the manufacturer’s wholesale price, the financial institution’s accounts receivable pledge ratio, and the profits of the participating firms. The effects of the revenue-sharing coefficient on operational and financing decisions are further examined. The results show that, without contractual coordination, double marginalization and information asymmetry create interdependence and conflicts among ordering, pricing, and pledge decisions, leading to inefficient supply chain coordination. The introduction of a revenue-sharing contract reshapes the allocation of sales revenue and improves the interaction among the manufacturer’s pricing decision, the retailer’s ordering decision, and the financial institution’s financing decision. Within a feasible range of revenue-sharing coefficients that satisfies the participation constraints of all parties, member profits and overall supply chain performance are improved. The study also discusses practical issues related to information verification, monitoring costs, default liability, and contract parameter adjustment. The findings show that revenue-sharing contracts can improve the coordination of operational and financing decisions and provide managerial insights for the operational optimization of supply chain accounts receivable pledge financing.