主体的退场与世界的显现——《庄子》“心斋”思想的现象学解读
The Withdrawal of the Subject and the Manifestation of the World—A Phenomenological Reading of “Xinzhai” in the Zhuangzi
DOI: 10.12677/acpp.2026.1511526, PDF,   
作者: 周越洋:扬州大学社会发展学院,江苏 扬州;扬州文化书院(江苏省研究生工作站),江苏 扬州
关键词: 庄子;心斋;现象学;主体;气;Zhuangzi; Xinzhai; Phenomenology; Subjectivity; Qi
摘要: 本文以《庄子·人间世》的“心斋”论述为中心,借助现象学视域考察心斋如何改变人与世界之间的关系。文章依循“听之以耳”“听之以心”“听之以气”的文本次序,讨论“丧我”与“心若镜”所呈现的主体状态及应物方式。通过与胡塞尔的悬置、海德格尔关于主体与存在的思考,以及梅洛–庞蒂的身体现象学展开比较,本文指出,心斋不仅涉及既有认知成见的搁置,也包含自我中心性及主体支配立场的松动,并进一步指向身体经验与气化思想。结合毕来德、陈赟、赖锡三等学者的讨论,本文认为,赖锡三的三层身体观具有整合性解释力,但不宜被理解为固定的阶段序列;“气化身体”所提示的,是经验主体与世界之间关系的重新理解,而非将身体简单扩展为宇宙。由此,心斋可被理解为主体参与经验方式的转变:“应而不藏”体现了开放而有回应力、却不固着于成见的经验状态。本文亦据此讨论心斋对于反思对象化思维的启发,并说明现象学比较的理论边界。
Abstract: Centering on the discourse of xinzhai (the fasting of the mind) in the “Renjian Shi” (In the World of Men) chapter of the Zhuangzi, this article examines how xinzhai transforms the relationship between the human subject and the world through a phenomenological lens. Following the textual sequence of “listening with the ears,” “listening with the mind,” and “listening with qi” (vital energy), this study discusses the subjective state and mode of responding to things manifested in “losing oneself” (sangwo) and “the mind as a mirror.” By drawing comparisons with Edmund Husserl’s epoché, Martin Heidegger’s reflections on the subject and Being, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body, this article argues that xinzhai involves not only the suspension of preexisting cognitive prejudices but also the loosening of egocentrism and the subject’s dominant stance, further pointing toward bodily experience and the philosophy of qi-transformation (qihua). Engaging with the scholarly discussions of Jean François Billeter, Chen Yun, and Lai Hsi-san, this paper contends that while Lai’s three-layered view of the body possesses integrative explanatory power, it should not be conceptualized as a fixed sequential progression. Rather than a simplistic expansion of the body into the cosmos, what the “qi-transformed body” suggests is a radical reimagining of the relation between the experiencing subject and the world. Consequently, xinzhai can be understood as a transformation in how the subject participates in experience: “responding without harboring” (ying er bu cang) embodies an experiential state that is open and responsive, yet free from fixed preconceptions. On this basis, the article concludes by exploring how xinzhai inspires a critical reflection on objectifying thought, while clarifying the theoretical boundaries of such phenomenological comparisons.
文章引用:周越洋. 主体的退场与世界的显现——《庄子》“心斋”思想的现象学解读[J]. 哲学进展, 2026, 15(11): 200-205. https://doi.org/10.12677/acpp.2026.1511526

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