跨越事实与价值之间的鸿沟

Cross the Gap between Facts and Values

摘要: 自“休谟问题”提出以来，事实与价值之间的关系一直是伦理学关注的重点。哲学家们纷纷探讨研究，对两者之间关系的认知经历了二分、缠结等变化。斯坎伦于2014年再一次论述了规范性与非规范之间的关系，更加明确地澄清两者之间的关系，并指出两者之间的关系为随附性和共变性的关系，我们应该打破两者之间不可逾越的鸿沟。

Abstract: Since Hume’s Question was put forward, the relationship between facts and values has always been the focus of ethics. With the advancement of philosophers’ research, the relationship expe-rienced the changes from binary opposition, winding, and so on. In 2014, Scanlon discussed the relationship between normalization and non-normalization again, making it more clear, and pointed out that the relationship is supervenient and covariant. We should break the impassable gulf between them.

文章引用：陶勤. 跨越事实与价值之间的鸿沟[J]. 哲学进展, 2017, 6(4): 23-28. https://doi.org/10.12677/ACPP.2017.64004

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