针对非可信源的特洛伊木马攻击技术研究
Analysis of Trojan-Horse Attack against Untrusted Source
DOI: 10.12677/CSA.2018.81009, PDF,  被引量   
作者: 于家涛*:战略支援部队信息工程大学,河南 洛阳;解放军95833部队,北京;李宏欣, 韩 宇, 张书轶, 王 伟:战略支援部队信息工程大学,河南 洛阳;葛文祖:解放军68303部队,甘肃 兰州;张贵林:战略支援部队信息工程大学,河南 洛阳;解放军68303部队,甘肃 兰州
关键词: 量子密钥分发非可信源Ekert91协议特洛伊木马攻击Quantum Key Distribution Untrusted Source Ekert91 Protocol Trojan-Horse Attack
摘要: 飞速发展的信息时代对信息安全保护提出了更高的要求,近年来基于量子物理属性的量子密码因其安全高效的优点而受到广泛关注。然而实际量子密钥分发系统往往达不到理想状态,这给实际通信系统带来很多安全性问题。本文首先介绍了基于量子纠缠的Ekert91量子密钥分发协议的原理和基本流程,在此基础上,借鉴基于极化单光子量子密钥分发协议中的特洛伊木马攻击思想,设计了针对纠缠协议的量子黑客攻击方案,同时对攻击思想、攻击原理、攻击步骤以及攻击效果进行了详细的分析。通过验证分析,所提攻击方案针对构成安全密钥的EPR光子对总量的30%进行测量,窃听者可以获得29.25%的安全密钥且只引入0.75%的误码率,具有重要的理论意义和现实可行性。
Abstract: The rapid development of information age puts forward higher requirements on information se-curity protection. In recent years, quantum cryptography based on the theory of quantum physics gets more and more attention because of its reliability and high efficiency. However, the practical quantum key distribution system often cannot achieve the ideal state, which causes many security problems to the practical communication system. Firstly, this paper introduces the Ekert91 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol based on quantum entanglement. Then, we propose a partial Trojan-horse attack scheme against this protocol and analyze the theory, process and the effect of the attack. The scheme measures thirty percent of EPR photon pairs used in the formation of security keys, the eavesdropper can obtain twenty-nine point two-five percent of security keys and only causes zero point seven-five percent error rate. The scheme possesses important theoretical significance and realistic feasibility.
文章引用:于家涛, 李宏欣, 葛文祖, 张贵林, 韩宇, 张书轶, 王伟. 针对非可信源的特洛伊木马攻击技术研究[J]. 计算机科学与应用, 2018, 8(1): 59-66. https://doi.org/10.12677/CSA.2018.81009

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