股权集中与制衡对企业生存能力影响研究—基于企业成长期和成熟期视角
Research on the Influence of Equity Concentration and Balance on the Viability of Enterprises—Based on the Perspective of Enterprise Growth and Maturity
DOI: 10.12677/FIA.2018.72003, PDF,   
作者: 王媛媛:中国移动通信集团内蒙古有限公司,内蒙古 通辽;赵圆圆:内蒙古大学经济管理学院,内蒙古 呼和浩特
关键词: 股权集中股权制衡生存能力成长期成熟期Ownership Concentration Ownership Balance Viability Growth Period Maturity Period
摘要: 股权结构对公司治理、绩效与生存能力的影响一直是学术界讨论的热门话题,其争论的结果逐渐形成了“监控假说”和“侵占假说”两种观点。“监控假说”认为一定程度的股权集中更有利于激励持股股东对代理人的监督,提高决策效率,进而促使企业效益与生存能力获得进一步的提升;而“侵占假说”则认为股权集中,大股东容易侵占小股东的利益,不利企业治理以及生存能力的提升。采用实证研究的方法,以2013至2015年沪、深上市的制造业企业财务数据为样本,基于企业生命周期的视角,特别是在成长期、成熟期公司面对不同的竞争环境表现出来的特征为依据,建立相应的多元回归模型,进行数据分析与实证检验,分析上市公司在成长期、成熟期两阶段内股权集中与制衡对企业生存能力的影响。研究发现,成长期公司股权集中度和其生存能力间存在正相关,而成熟期公司股权集中度和其生存能力间存在U型相关;股权制衡度和其生存能力之间存在着倒U型关系。提出了公司应当辩证的看待股权集中的现象、公司的股权制衡度要适当、公司在不同生命周期阶段需匹配相关资源的政策建议。
Abstract: The ownership structure of corporate governance, performance and the influence of the survival ability has always been a hot topic of the academic discussion, and gradually formed two perspectives: The monitor hypothesis and the occupation hypothesis. The monitor hypothesis that a certain degree of equity concentration is more advantageous to incentive equity shareholders of the agent of supervision, improves the efficiency of decision making, prompting the enterprise benefit and viability for further ascension. The “occupying occupation hypothesis” holds that the ownership of the stock is concentrated, and it is easy for large shareholders to infringe on the interests of the minority shareholders, and it is also not conducive to the improvement of corporate governance and survivability. This article adopts an empirical research method and uses the financial data of manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2013 to 2015 as a sample. Based on the perspective of the company’s life cycle and performance in different competitive environments of the growth and maturity period, this paper establishes a multivariate regression model to conduct data analysis and empirical test, and analyzes the influence of the concentration and balance of listed companies on the viability of the company in the stages of growth and maturity. The study finds that there is a positive correlation between equity concentration of companies in growth companies and their viability, while a U-shaped correlation between the concentration of company ownership and its viability in mature companies; there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between ownership balance degree and its viability. The paper puts forward that the company should consider the phenomenon of ownership concentration, the degree of ownership balance of the company, and the policy Suggestions of the company to match the related resources in different life cycle stages.
文章引用:王媛媛, 赵圆圆. 股权集中与制衡对企业生存能力影响研究—基于企业成长期和成熟期视角[J]. 国际会计前沿, 2018, 7(2): 15-27. https://doi.org/10.12677/FIA.2018.72003

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