我国上市公司高管特征对投资效率影响的实证研究—基于股权激励的调节效应
Empirical Research on the Impact of TMT’s Characteristics on Investment Efficiency in China’s Listed Companies—Based on the Moderating Effect of Equity Incentive
摘要: 本文从公司治理机制中股权激励的调节效应角度出发,实证检验了高管背景特征影响企业投资效率的作用机制。基于委托代理理论、高层梯队理论与激励理论,选用2006年至2016年间沪深两市A股上市公司作为样本,研究发现:1) 高管平均年龄、平均学历和平均任期均与企业的投资效率呈显著正相关关系。高管团队性别特征与企业投资效率没有显著关系。2) 股权激励能够增强高管平均学历、平均任期和投资效率之间的关系,但对高管性别、平均年龄和企业投资效率间的关系无显著调节作用。3) 区分产权性质发现,国有企业和非国有企业中股权激励对高管背景特征与企业投资效率关系的调节程度具有差异性。企业在选择高管人员时应关注高管背景特征,有侧重的优化高管团队人员构成,增加年龄大、学历高的高管人员比例,适当延长高管人员任期,并制定合理的股权激励政策,以提高企业投资效率。
Abstract: From the perspective of corporate governance, this paper analyzes equity incentive mechanism’s moderating effect on the relationship between TMT’s characteristics and investment efficiency. Based on the upper echelons theory, principal agent theory and incentive theory, this thesis uses A-share Chinese listed companies during 2006-2016 as a sample, and makes use of empirical method to do the analysis. The results demonstrate that: 1) There is a positive relationship between TMT’s age and investment efficiency, so as the relationship between TMT’s tenure, education level and investment efficiency; there is no significant relationship between TMT’s gender and investment efficiency. 2) Equity incentive mechanism has positive moderating effects on the relationship between TMT’s education and investment efficiency, on the TMT’s tenure and investment efficiency. But it has no significant effect on the relationship between TMT’s gender, age, and investment efficiency. 3) By distinguishing the company nature, it shows that equity incentive’s moderating effect is different between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. When selecting senior managers, companies should pay attention to their characteristics, focus on optimizing the composition of top management team. It is advisable to increase the proportion of senior managers with high age and academic qualifications, appropriately extend the tenure of senior managers. Besides, companies should formulate reasonable equity incentive policies to increase the investment efficiency.
文章引用:林庭谣, 胡晓宇, 牛霞. 我国上市公司高管特征对投资效率影响的实证研究—基于股权激励的调节效应[J]. 国际会计前沿, 2018, 7(2): 28-38. https://doi.org/10.12677/FIA.2018.72004

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