城市物流“最后一公里”快递外包机制博弈分析

The Game Analysis of the “Last Kilometer” Express Delivery Outsourcing Mechanism in Urban Logistics

摘要: 本文针对快递“最后一公里”共同配送的情境，采取全部外包策略，设立投资成本分担机制，提高末端配送整合积极性。通过数学模型，对比快递企业自营时的投入及所得，得出外包情况下各企业和供应链的最优利润，并由此讨论末端配送成本、投资成本分摊比例、快递承包商(LCM)服务能力、服务水平和惩罚成本对双方——快递外包商(LOEM)及承包商(LCM)最优利润和外包策略的影响。研究发现，快递末端外包有利于资源整合，提高城市电子商务“最后一公里”的配送效率，迎合高效的城市物流管理理念。

Abstract: This paper adopts all outsourcing strategies and sets up an investment cost sharing mechanism to improve the integration of terminal distribution. Through the mathematical model, comparing the input and income of the express delivery companies themselves, the optimal profits of the various companies and supply chains in the outsourcing situation are obtained, and the end-to-end distribution costs, investment cost allocation ratios, and express delivery contractor (LCM) services’ impact of capabilities, service levels, and penalty costs on the optimal profit and outsourcing strategy of both parties—Express Outsourcer (LOEMs) and contractors (LCMs) are discussed. The study found that the outsourcing of express delivery is conducive to the integration of resources, improving the efficiency of the “last mile” of ecommerce in cities, and meeting the concept of efficient urban logistics management.