关于我国排污权企业经济性的思考及对策

Thoughts on China’s Emissions Trading in the Economical Sensitivity of Enterprises and Countermeasures

摘要: 排污权交易制度的理论支撑是科斯产权理论，其运行机制为给予企业选择减排成本的灵活性，引导、激励排污企业技术创新和升级。其运行机制背后暗藏了一个容易被人忽视的前提假设，即参与企业对生产成本价格敏感且内含追求利润最大化的内在原生动力。然而，目前我国企业由于受公有制经济的影响，尤其是国企存在产权不清晰、政府父爱主义浓厚导致我国排污权参与企业经济性低且参与度不高。本文尝试从我国排污权试点的国企和私企比例关联其二级市场活跃度做Spearman秩序相关性分析，得出高比例国企影响排污权二级市场活跃度的结论，最后为提高我国排污权参与企业经济性给予对策建议。

Abstract: The theoretical support of the emissions trading system is Coase’s property rights theory. Its op-erating mechanism is to give companies the flexibility to choose abatement costs and to guide and incentivize the technological innovation and upgrade of the polluting enterprises. Behind its op-erating mechanism, an assumption that is easily overlooked is hidden, that is, participating com-panies are sensitive to the cost of production costs and have inherent motivation to pursue profit maximization. However, at present, due to the influence of the public ownership economy, espe-cially the existence of unclear property rights in state-owned enterprises, and the strong fatherhood of the government, our country’s emission rights participation enterprises have low economy and low participation. This paper attempts to start with the proportion of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in China’s emissions trading and associate them with the secondary market activity applying Spearman correlation analysis, and draws conclusions that a high proportion of state-owned enterprises affects the activity of the secondary market for emission rights. Finally, it gives suggestions for improving the economic efficiency of China’s emission allowance enterprises.