政治关联、制度差异与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性

Political Connections, Institutional Differences and Executives’ Pay-Performance Sensitivity

摘要: 一直以来，上市公司的“天价”高管薪酬都是社会公众关注的热门话题。本文以2012~2016年沪深A股民营上市公司的高管薪酬-业绩敏感性为对象，研究政治关联对其影响，然后引入制度差异因素，考察不同制度水平下该敏感性受政治关联影响程度的差异。为保证企业的政治关系是企业自发性建立，而非政府通过国有企业强加的，本文选择研究民营公司。实证结果表明，企业高管的政治关联与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性成反比，并且在制度环境较好的地区，政治关联对其影响会减弱。文章丰富了高管薪酬激励研究方面的经验证据，对我国民营企业高管薪酬激励制度的改进也具有借鉴价值。

Abstract: All along, the executive compensation of listed companies is a hot topic of public concern. This paper studies the influence of political association on the executive pay-performance sensitivity of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share private listed firms from 2012 to 2016, then introduces the differences of the system, and examines its influence. In order to ensure that the political relationship is the spontaneous establishment of enterprises, rather than imposed by government, this paper chooses to study private firms. The empirical results show that the political connection of the firm is inversely proportional to the executive pay-performance sensitivity, and the influence is weakened in areas with better institutional environment. The article enriches the empirical evidence of the executive compensation incentive research, and also has the reference value to the improvement of the executive pay-incentive system.