基于主从博弈及分时电价引导的电动汽车充放电控制策略研究

Study on Charge and Discharge Control Strategies of Electric Vehicles Based on Stackelberg Game and Time-of-Use Price Guidance

摘要: 随着入网电动汽车数量的增加，如何在满足电力系统稳定的基础上，实现电网、车主双方利益最大化是当前亟需解决的问题。本文基于主从博弈理论及分时电价激励机制，创建了兼顾电网负荷波动率以及车主收益的分时电价及电动汽车充放电功率优化模型。并在电网负荷平衡、系统静态稳定、电动汽车可入网容量等综合约束下，求取了满足博弈双方利益最大化的电动汽车充放电策略及分时电价。结果表明，在电动汽车可供电容量占2.33%最大负荷容量时，主从博弈及分时电价引导策略可使电网负荷峰谷差率降低12.15%，电压稳定裕度的标准差提高24.7%，单辆汽车日均收益达到10.8元，取得了良好的调控效果。

Abstract: With the increase in the number of electric vehicles entering the grid, how to maximize the inter-ests of both the grid and vehicle owners on the basis of meeting the stability of the electric power system is an urgent problem to be solved. Based on the Stackelberg game theory and the time-of-use price incentive mechanism, this paper establishes a time-average tariff that takes into account the load fluctuation rate of the grid and the owner's revenue, as well as the charging and discharging power optimization model of the electric vehicle. And under the comprehensive con-straints of grid load balancing, system static stability, and the capacity of electric vehicles that can be networked, the charging and discharging strategies and time-shared price of electric vehicles satisfying the maximization of the interests of both parties are determined. The results show that when the available capacity of electric vehicles accounts for 2.33% of the maximum load capacity, the Stackelberg game and the time-shared price guide strategy can reduce the peak load-to-valley load ratio of the power grid by 12.15% and the standard deviation of the voltage stability margin by 24.7%. The average daily income of vehicles reached 10.8 RMB, and good control effects were achieved.