不同经营目标下考虑质量水平的供应链定价博弈研究

Research on Supply Chain Pricing Game Considering Quality Level under Different Business Objectives

摘要: 为了解决两个具有竞争关系的制造商和一个零售商构成的两级供应链的定价问题，研究在不同策略下质量水平对定价决策的影响，构建了不同经营目标下供应链的定价决策模型。运用Stackelberg博弈求出了该模型的最优定价与最优利润，并数值模拟了质量水平对批发价、零售价的影响。结果表明：以自身利润为经营目标策略下的批发价、零售价高于以相对利润为经营目标策略下的批发价、零售价；两种策略下，两制造商在以自身利润为经营目标策略下的利润较高，而零售商在以相对利润为经营目标策略下的利润较高。

Abstract: In order to solve the pricing problem of two-level supply chain composed of two competitive man-ufacturers and one retailer, the influence of quality level on pricing decision under different strategies is studied, and the pricing decision model of supply chain under different business ob-jectives is constructed. The optimal pricing and optimal profit of the model are obtained by Stackelberg game, and the impact of quality level on wholesale price and retail price is numerically simulated. The results show that the wholesale price and retail price under the strategy of its own profit are higher than the wholesale price and retail price under the strategy of relative profit. Under the two strategies, two manufacturers’ profit is higher under the strategy of their own profit and the retailer's profit under the strategy of relative profit is higher.