中国土地承包经营权流转模式比较分析

Comparative Analysis on the Transfer Model of China’s Management Rights of Contracted Rural Lands

摘要: 21世纪中国的人口红利衰弱，随之而来的是对土地巨大潜力的挖掘与释放，农村土地的承包经营权利的分离与流转已成必然趋势。然而流转过程中的交易费用严重制约着土地流转的步伐，阻碍规模化、现代化的农业经营。基于此，该文结合我国国情和现行文献，将我国土地经营流转划分为行政干预型和市场自发型模式，并进一步根据流转载体和方式不同，将前者划分政府参与型和集体参与型，后者划分为中介组织型和农户自发型。并构建交易费用函数模型和社会绩效函数模型。通过对比不同模式下的交易费用大小和社会绩效优劣，得出集体参与型与中介组织型的交易费用较另外两种模式更低，社会绩效较高，整体更优的基本结论。但具体选择哪种流转模式或流转市场，需要因地适宜，结合当地的经济发展水平和制度环境，从不同立场做出判断。最后一部分文章提出结论与相关建议，为政策和政府相关决策提供理论依据。

Abstract: It is considered that we need excavate and release the potential of rural land, when demographic dividend plays out gradually in the 21st century. The circulation of contracting rights of rural land has been an inevitable trend. However, transaction costs in the circulation severely hinder the process of circulation, and impede the modernization of agricultural large-scale management. Considering actual situations in China and current literatures, this paper divides land contractual right circulation into two main types, namely, administrative interference patterns and market spontaneous patterns. Further, according to varied carriers and methods in circulations, the former is categorized in government involved and collective involved circulation. At the same time, the latter is categorized in intermediary organization and farmer spontaneous circulation. In addition, the paper builds the function model of transaction costs and social performance. Through comparing the transaction costs and social performance among different circulations, the paper draws a basic conclusion: the transaction costs of both collective involved circulation and intermediary organization circulation are lower than another two kinds of circulations and their performance is also better than another two’s. Government need consider the level of economic development and actual institutions when making a choice of circulation model. Finally, I make summaries and suggestions, which might be available to policy.