伤害感知对道德判断的影响
The Effect of Perceived Harm on Moral Judgment
DOI: 10.12677/AP.2019.93070, PDF,   
作者: 欧阳智:湖南师范大学教育科学学院心理学系,湖南 长沙
关键词: 伤害感知道德判断二元道德理论Perceived Harm Moral Judgment The Theory of Dyadic Morality
摘要: 道德判断,一直作为道德心理领域的研究重点而备受关注。近年来,二元道德理论的兴起,为道德判断的研究提供了一个崭新视角,并开始引导人们转向关注道德判断的内在心理机制。本研究通过文献梳理发现,二元道德理论以全新的伤害概念,重新界定了传统的道德判断,其主要观点认为,伤害感知是道德判断的核心成分,且伤害感知与道德判断互为因果关系。此外,伤害感知自身存在的连续性和包容性,同时赋予了道德判断的多元化特征。
Abstract: Moral judgment has always been a focus of research in the field of moral psychology. In recent years, the introduction of the Theory of Dyadic Morality has provided a new perspective for the study of moral judgment, and it has led scholars turn to explore the internal psychological me-chanisms of moral judgment. Through reviewing of the literature, it is found that the Theory of Dyadic Morality redefines traditional moral judgment with the new definition of harm. Further-more, its main point is that perceived harm is the core component of moral judgment, which is also in reciprocal causation with moral judgment. In addition, the perceived harm itself has the characteristics of continuity and inclusiveness, and at the same time, it also gives the characteristics of moral judgment to be diversified.
文章引用:欧阳智 (2019). 伤害感知对道德判断的影响. 心理学进展, 9(3), 558-262. https://doi.org/10.12677/AP.2019.93070

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