新型权利证成的利益衡量新解
A New Approach to the Measurement of Benefits of New Rights
摘要:
对新型权利的证成而言,寻找其权利内部的道德价值尤为关键。而当同样拥有道德价值的利益和利益发生冲突时,最为有效的法学方法即是利益衡量。对法官而言,利益衡量注重思考过程,因此和人们的心智有所关联。从这个角度出发,从认知心理学的角度来看待道德判断也许会有意外收获。然而传统的双重过程理论无法帮助人们完成这一点,幸而还有主观功利论可以帮助人们更好地对道德判断进行认识。主观功利论视角下利益衡量更侧重于人们的认知本质,在认知上人们以理性为基础,同时无法避免情感这一因素的影响。这是人们在认知上就已经被固定的机制,因此不能违背而只能顺从。此外,由于善与善之间的哲学困境始终存在且无法在理论上得到解答,因此只能从程序的角度出发,在实践层面得到具有较强说服力的答案。最后,同样有一些额外的因素需要在利益衡量之后予以考察。
Abstract:
For the certification of new rights, it is very important to find the moral value within the rights. When the interests with the same moral value are in conflict with each other, the most effective le-gal method is an interest measurement. For judges, the balance of interests focuses on the thinking process, so it has something to do with people’s mind. From this point of view, from the perspective of cognitive psychology, moral judgment may have unexpected gains. However, the traditional dual process theory cannot help people to achieve this. Fortunately, there is also subjective utilitarian-ism which can help people better understand moral judgment. From the perspective of subjective utilitarianism, interest measurement focuses more on people’s cognitive nature. In cognition, peo-ple are based on rationality and cannot avoid the influence of emotion. This is a mechanism that people have been fixed in cognition, so they can’t disobey but obey. Moreover, the philosophical di-lemma between the good and the good always exists and cannot be solved theoretically, so, only from the perspective of procedure, we can get a more convincing answer in practice. Finally, there are also some additional factors that need to be examined after the balance of interests.
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