考虑CSR的第三方回收闭环供应链定价与协调

Pricing and Coordination for a Third-Party Collection Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Consideration of CSR

摘要: 本文围绕第三方回收的闭环供应链系统，考虑制造商和零售商共同履行CSR，将消费者剩余作为CSR绩效指标，基于此分别构建优化模型和Stackelberg博弈模型得到集中式决策和分散式决策下的零售价、回收率、成员效用(利润)与系统总效用，然后探讨收入共享–成本共担契约在闭环供应链协调中的适用性，进而分析CSR履行水平对相关绩效指标和契约参数可行范围的影响，研究结论表明：1) 分散式决策下的零售价和回收率分别高于和低于集中式决策，渠道总效用低于集中式决策；在分散式决策下，零售商CSR履行水平增加对渠道效率、回收率和消费者剩余产生的积极影响大于同等程度制造商CSR履行程度的增加；2) 当制造商与零售商的CSR履行水平满足一定条件时，若契约参数亦在合理范围内，则RCS契约能够完美协调该闭环供应链，并实现三方效用(利润)的Pareto改进。

Abstract: For a third-party-collection closed-loop supply chain system in which both the manufacturer and the retailer perform CSR, this paper establishes the optimization model and Stackelberg game model to derive the equilibrium prices, collection rate, the parties’ utilities (profits) and total utility of the entire closed loop supply chain in centralized and decentralized decision-making models. Consumer surplus is treated as the measurement index of CSR performance. The applicability of revenue-cost sharing contract (RCS) in the coordination of decentralized closed-loop supply chain is examined. It also focuses on the impacts of both parties’ CSR levels on the performance indexes and the feasible ranges of contract parameters. The conclusions of this thesis show that: 1) The product prices and collection rate under decentralized decision is higher and lower than those under centralized decision, respectively. The total channel utility under decentralized decision is lower than that under centralized decision; under decentralized model, the improvement of CSR performing level of the retailer has a greater positive impact on channel efficiency, collection rate and consumer surplus than that of the manufacturer with the same CSR level’s increasing; 2) When the CSR levels of the manufacturer and the retailer satisfy a certain condition and contact parameters are all in reasonable ranges, RCS contract can perfectly coordinate this closed-loop supply chains with third-party collection, and realize the Pareto improvement for all three parties’ utilities (profits).