疫情期间劳动合同履行不能的风险负担规则探究
Research on the Risk Burden Rules for the Failure to Perform Labor Contracts during the Epidemic
摘要: 疫情期间劳动合同履行不能存在的问题主要是用人单位和员工的劳动关系能否继续存续以及工资风险的负担。当疫情及其引发的政府管制行为这种不可归功于双方的原因出现时,国家政策一刀切式地将风险转嫁至用人单位虽然最大限度地保障了劳动者的生存发展权,但也可能成为压垮企业的最后一根稻草。在分析这个问题时,应当首先对导致合同履行不能的原因做类型化分析,因劳动者自身原因导致的,应该适当援引“病假”和“事假”规则;因用人单位原因导致的,应当区分“经营风险”和“运营风险”两种情形,用人单位原则上都应该承担工资支付义务,但这也不应该是绝对的,还应充分发挥劳资双方的协商功能,实行弹性的工作制度。最后,应充分发挥社会救助的作用,缓解劳资矛盾,维护社会稳定。
Abstract:
During the epidemic, the problems that cannot exist in the performance of labor contracts are mainly whether the labor relationship between employers and employees can continue and the burden of wage risks. When the epidemic and the resulting government control behaviors cannot be attributed to both sides, the national policy transfers the risk to the employers across the board. Although it maximizes the protection of the laborers’ right to survival and development, it may also become the last straw to overwhelm the enterprise. When analyzing this problem, we should first make a typed analysis of the reasons leading to the inability to perform the contract. The rules of “sick leave” and “personal leave” should be appropriately invoked due to the employee’s own rea-sons; the “operational risk” and “operational risk” should be distinguished for the employer’s rea-sons, and the employer should bear wages in principle. There is the obligation to pay, but this should not be absolute, and the negotiation function of labor and management should be brought into full play, and a flexible working system should be implemented. Finally, we should give full play to the role of social assistance, ease labor-management conflicts, and maintain social stability.
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