基于有限理性的地摊经济演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Stall Economy Based on Bounded Rationality

摘要: 地摊经济是新时代保民生、促就业的重要举措，其如何在新时代持续健康发展一直是政府和人民关注的重要问题。本文基于局中人都是有限理性的前提下，系统分析了地摊经济中的政府、地摊摊主和消费者策略选择的演化过程。结果表明：当形象收益和不监管损失增大、监管成本和补贴降低时，政府倾向于选择监管；当合规摆摊成本和违规摆摊收益降低、合规摆摊收益和违规摆摊成本增大、违规摆摊导致的客户流失和政府处罚增大时，地摊摊主倾向于选择合规摆摊；当消费者选择摊主所获得的收益增大、选择违规摊主的损失降低、选择商店得到的质量保证收益和价格收益降低时，消费者倾向于选择地摊摊主。

Abstract: In this paper, the stall economy is an important measure to protect people’s livelihood and promote employment in the new era, and how to develop sustainably and healthily in the new era has been an important issue for the government and the people. Based on the premise that the players are bounded rationality, this paper systematically analyzes the evolution process of government, stall owner and consumers’ strategic choices in the stall economy. The results show that when the benefits of image and unregulated loss increase, regulatory costs and subsidies decrease, the government tends to choose regulation. When the cost of compliance and the benefits of illegal stalls decrease, and the benefits of compliance and the cost of illegal stalls increase, the loss of customers caused by illegal stalls and the amount of government punishment increase, the stall owners tend to choose compliance with the stalls. Consumers tend to choose stall owners, when the income they get from choosing stall owners increases, the loose of choosing illegal stall owners decreases, and the quality assurance income and price income obtained from choosing shops decrease.