绿色信贷交易行为的演化博弈模仿动态分析

Imitation Dynamics Analysis of Evolutionary Game for Green Credit Transaction Behavior

摘要: 绿色信贷是一项用经济杠杆引导环保的发展政策，为了分析绿色信贷中各博弈方策略选择的演化行为，基于绿色信贷中政府、银行和企业博弈方的收益与演化动态中的模仿机制，构建了绿色信贷交易行为中三个博弈方的成比例模仿动态。首先，应用演化博弈中分析稳定点的理论，求出动态方程的Jacobian矩阵，分析Jacobian矩阵的特征值在各个平衡点的符号，得到各个平衡点在不同的收益条件下的稳定性情况。然后分析不同奖惩力度对各博弈方策略选择的影响，得出奖惩力度对政府、银行和企业的策略选择有着很大影响，奖惩力度非常小时，政府、银行和企业偏向选择非绿色信贷策略；奖惩力度越大，政府、银行和企业选择绿色行为的意愿更大。

Abstract: Green credit is a development policy that uses economic leverage to guide environmental protection. In order to analyze the evolutionary behavior of all players in green credit, the proportional imitation dynamics of three players in green credit are constructed based on the imitation mechanism of evolutionary game and the benefits of government, commercial bank and enterprise players. Firstly, by using the theory of analyzing stable points in evolutionary game, obtain the Jacobian matrix of dynamic equations, analyze the sign of eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix in each equilibrium point, and obtain the stability of each equilibrium point under different profit conditions. Then analyze the influence of different reward and punishment intensity on the strategy choice of each player, and conclude that the reward and punishment intensity have a great influence on the strategy choice of the government, commercial banks and enterprises. When the reward and punishment intensity is small, the government, banks and enterprises tend to choose non-green credit strategy. The greater the incentives and punishments, the greater willingness of governments, commercial banks and enterprises to choose green behaviors.