社会资本参与民办养老服务机构融资研究
Study on the Incentive and Constraint Mechanism of Social Capital Participation in Financing of Public Welfare Private Elderly Institutions
摘要: 公益性民办养老机构作为公办养老机构的重要补充,对健全我国养老服务体系具有重要意义。本文基于经济学委托代理和博弈理论框架,从养老服务的公益性和社会资本的逐利性出发,对社会资本参与公益性民办养老机构融资的激励机制和民办养老机构公益性可持续的约束机制进行研究,激励模型表明,社会资本的投资能力越强,政府应给予更多的利益分成,以激励其加大投资力度;同时社会资本的投资成本越大、风险规避态度越强,其投资能力越弱,这种情况下即便给予较高程度的激励,也难以促进其加大投资力度。约束模型表明,当政府投入不足时,民办养老机构将不得不选择从事营利性经营以获得额外收益以维持正常经营。同时政府主管部门对民办养老机构的监管力度受制于监管成本,导致政府监管缺位,对民办养老机构起不到目标约束作用。
Abstract: As an important supplement to public elderly institutions, private elderly institutions are of great significance to the improvement of China’s elderly service system. Based on the framework of eco-nomic principal-agent and game theory, this paper studies the incentive mechanism for social capi-tal to participate in the financing of private aged-care institutions and the constraint mechanism for the sustainability of the public welfare of private aged-care institutions from the perspective of the public welfare of aged-care services and the profit-seeking nature of social capital. The incentive model shows that the stronger the investment ability of social capital, the more the government should give more benefit shares to motivate it to invest more; at the same time, the greater the in-vestment cost of social. At the same time, the higher the investment cost and the stronger the risk-averse attitude of social capital, the weaker its ability to invest, and in this case, even if it is given a higher degree of incentive, it is difficult to promote its investment. The constraint model suggests that when government investment is insufficient, private elderly care institutions will have to choose to operate for profit in order to generate additional revenue to maintain normal op-erations. At the same time, the government authorities’ supervision of private aged-care institu-tions is limited by the cost of supervision, resulting in a lack of government supervision and a lack of target constraints on private aged-care institutions.
文章引用:刘立龙. 社会资本参与民办养老服务机构融资研究[J]. 应用数学进展, 2022, 11(8): 5595-5604. https://doi.org/10.12677/AAM.2022.118590

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