基于随机演化博弈的高速公路PPP模式的演化分析

Evolution Analysis of Highway PPP Mode Based on Stochastic Evolutionary Game

摘要: 在研究高速公路PPP模式中，考虑内外部环境的不确定性，将高斯白噪声作为随机干扰项引入演化博弈，构建政府、社会主体(企业)、ETC通行者三方间的随机演化博弈模型，分析在不确定环境下策略演化稳定性所需满足的条件，初始值、随机干扰强度及不同因素分别对三方策略选择的影响。将Itô随机微分方程用随机泰勒展开后进行数值仿真来验证理论的正确性。研究发现，博弈三方初始意愿、随机干扰强度、政府定期监管成本、识别机会主义概率、偷逃通行费罚款等参数均只改变收敛速度而不改变策略的收敛状态。最后我们给出了高速公路更好运营与发展的有益的建议。

Abstract: In the study of highway PPP mode, the uncertainty of the internal and external environment is con-sidered, and white Gaussian noise is introduced into the evolutionary game as a random interfer-ence term. We construct a stochastic evolutionary game model among the government, social enti-ties (enterprises) and ETC passers, and analyze the conditions required for the stability of strategy evolution under the uncertain environment, the initial value, the intensity of random interference and the influence of different factors on the strategy selection of the three parties. Itô stochastic dif-ferential equations are expanded by stochastic Taylor and then the numerical simulation is carried out to verify the correctness of the theory. It is found that the initial willingness of the three parties in the game, the intensity of random interference, the cost of regular government supervision, the probability of identifying opportunism, toll evasion fines and other parameters only change the convergence speed without changing the convergence state of the strategy. Finally, we give the highway better operation and development of useful suggestions.