重大卫生事件下政企应急物资点协同合作博弈研究

Study on Cooperative Game of Government and Enterprise Emergency Supplies Recruitment under Major Health Events

摘要: 为提高重大卫生事件突发情况下的应对效率，缓解特殊时期物流运输体系无法满足当即需求的问题，建立政府与相关企业间的演化博弈模型，将合作激励价值与合作感染风险放大系数引入模型，通过模型命题仿真，分析政府与企业间的应急物资点协同合作问题。结果表明，双方合作意愿与感染风险、可获得社会声望、合作感染风险放大系数、合作激励价值等因素有直接关系，尤其过高的合作激励价值将反过来抑制合作达成。本研究可为重大卫生事件突发时的应急物流建设提供参考。

Abstract: To improve the efficiency of major health event under the emergency response, ease the immediate problems in the special period that logistics transport system can’t meet the demand, establish a evolutionary game model between the government and relevant enterprises, the cooperation incentive value and risk of infection amplification coefficient were introduced into model, and the problem of emergency supplies point cooperation between the government and enterprises was analyzed through the model propositional simulation. The results show that the cooperative willingness is directly related to infection risk, social prestige, amplification coefficient of cooperative infection risk, cooperative incentive value and other factors, especially, the high cooperative incentive value will inhibit the cooperation. This study can provide reference for the construction of emergency logistics in the event of a major health event.