浅析虚无主义视角下个体人道主义的建构
On the construction of individual humanism from the perspective of nihilism
摘要: 在近代哲学向现代哲学的转变中,理性的地位逐渐被摒弃,理性并非人的唯一与主导,而非理性领域也得到了一定的拓展。人的价值很大程度上来自于人的理性精神,而理性地位的丧失,也导致人的价值陷入了危机。为了重新确立起人的价值,现代主体主义哲学扬起了“个体人道主义”的旗帜。个体人道主义,最早可以追溯至尼采,可以说,尼采奠定了个体人道主义的基础。尼采从上帝之死出发,要求价值重估,对生命道德价值进行重新建构,试图唤醒每个人的自由的超越的人格觉悟,成为自己。
Abstract:
In the transition from modern philosophy to modern philosophy, the position of rationality has been gradually abandoned, rationality is not the only and leading role of human beings, and the irrational field has been expanded to some extent. To a great extent, people’s value comes from people’s rational spirit, and the loss of rational status also leads to people’s value falling into crisis. In order to re-establish the value of human beings, modern subjective philosophy has raised the banner of “individual humanism”. Individual humanism can be traced back to Nietzsche at the earliest. It can be said that Nietzsche laid the foundation of individual humanism. Starting from the death of God, Nietzsche asked for re-evaluation of the value and re-construction of the moral value of life, trying to awaken everyone’s free and transcendent personality consciousness and become himself.
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