西田几多郎与摩尔:论“善”之比较
Nishida Kitaro and Moore: A Comparison of “Good”
摘要: “何为善?”这一问题长期困扰却始终诱使着无数哲人对其进行追问。西田认为“善”是理想的实现,也即意志的发展完成,摩尔则以“自然主义谬误”驳斥了以往传统伦理学,明确“善”是不可被定义的;尽管摩尔认为“善”不可定义,但并非不可被认识,与摩尔通过直觉认识“善”相似,西田则通过“知的直观”对“善”进行认知;摩尔站在经验主义基础上,将“善的行为”下落至实践,更强调伴随着行为所产生的效果;而西田则超越主客对立,通过人格所具有的天然统一性将个体善与社会善所结合。本文主要拟从什么是善、如何认识善、善的行为三个维度对二者的异同之处进行探讨。
Abstract:
“What is good?” This question has long troubled but always induced numerous philosophers to ask about it. While Nishida believed that the good is the realization of the ideal, i.e., the completion of the development of the will, Moore refuted the traditional ethics of the past with the “naturalistic fallacy” and made it clear that the good cannot be defined. Although Moore believes that the good is undefinable, it is not unknowable, and similar to Moore’s intuitive knowledge of the good, Nishida perceives the good through the “intuition of knowing.” Moore, on the basis of empiricism, brings the “good act” down to practice and emphasizes the effects that accompany the act; Nishida, on the other hand, transcends the subject-object dichotomy and combines the individual good with the social good through the natural unity of the personality. This paper focuses on the following in this paper, we will discuss the similarities and differences between the two in three dimensions: what is goodness, how to know goodness, and the act of goodness.
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