FRAND许可当事人双方善意协商规则研究
Research on the Rules of Good Faith Negotiation between the Parties to FRAND License
摘要: FRAND本身含义的模糊性为目前全球标准必要专利纠纷之解决造成了诸多困扰。在此背景下,各国多年来致力于促进FRAND许可环境走向清晰化与透明化。在这一过程中,各国家及地区不再仅仅关注具体FRAND条款的含义以及相关费率等问题,而是将目光拓展到了标准必要专利权利人与实施者之间的就FRAND许可进行磋商的整个过程——许可当事人双方之间的善意协商。而如何促进许可当事人双方进行善意协商,则成为各国所关注的新问题。本文通过对欧洲、美国、日本等国家及地区相关善意协商之司法实践进行系统性梳理,进而建议我国在厘清善意协商义务之来源的基础上采取司法与行政并行之方式指导相关许可实践,以达成促进善意协商之目的。
Abstract: The ambiguity of FRAND itself has caused a lot of troubles for the settlement of the current global standard essential patent disputes. In this context, countries have been working for many years to promote the FRAND licensing environment towards clarity and transparency. In this process, countries and regions are no longer only concerned with the meaning of specific FRAND provisions and related rates and oth-er issues, rather, it extends its vision to the whole process of FRAND license negotiation between the standard essential patentee and the implementer, that is, the good faith negotiation between the parties to license. How to promote the parties to the licensing of good faith negotiation has become a new issue of concern to all countries. This article systematically combs the judicial practice of good faith negotiation in Europe, the United States, Japan and other countries and regions, furthermore, it is suggested that China should take a judicial and administrative approach to guide the licensing practice on the basis of clarifying the source of the good faith negotiation obligation, so as to achieve the goal of promoting the good faith negotiation.
文章引用:魏家民. FRAND许可当事人双方善意协商规则研究[J]. 争议解决, 2022, 8(4): 1170-1177. https://doi.org/10.12677/DS.2022.84158

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