基于信息非对称的企业用户生成内容(UGC)运营策略研究

Research on the Operation Strategy of Enterprise User-Generated Content (UGC) Based on Information Asymmetry

摘要: 在口碑驱动的消费行为下，企业为了发挥消费者推荐的作用，在运营中投入一笔费用对消费者生成内容(UGC)进行管理干预以刺激更多的消费者购买产品。在此背景下，本文构建了企业质量信息非对称下企业与消费者之间的两阶段策略性竞争博弈模型，研究新消费品牌企业是否应该支付信息租金通过UGC运营投入决策实现信号传递，从而对消费者披露其真实类型，同时本文研究消费者对于用户生成内容(UGC)的敏感程度对企业决策的影响。研究发现：完全信息下，高质量类型的企业更愿意投入高成本用于UGC运营；不完全信息下，企业和消费者的信号博弈可以得到分离均衡解和混同均衡解，企业选择分离均衡或混同均衡与企业为高类型的初始概率以及高低类型企业的质量差异有关；同时，本文还探究了消费者对于UGC内容的敏感程度如何影响企业的UGC运营投入决策。

Abstract: Under word-of-mouth driven consumer behavior, firms invest a sum of money in operations to manage consumer-generated content (UGC) interventions to stimulate more consumers to purchase products in order to leverage consumer recommendations. In this context, this paper constructs a two-stage strategic competition game model between firms and consumers under the asymmetry of firm quality information to investigate whether new consumer brand firms should pay information rent to achieve signaling through UGC operational input decisions so as to disclose their true type to consumers, and this paper also investigates the impact of consumers’ sensitivity to user-generated content (UGC) on firms’ decisions. It is found that: under complete information, enterprises with high quality types are more willing to invest high cost in UGC operation; under incomplete information, the signaling game between enterprises and consumers can get both separated equilibrium solution and mixed equilibrium solution, and the enterprises’ choice of separated equilibrium or mixed equilibrium is related to the initial probability of enterprises with high types and the quality difference between enterprises with high and low types; meanwhile, this paper beaches for a long time how consumers’ sensitivity to UGC content affects enterprises’ decision. At the same time, this paper studies how consumers’ sensitivity to UGC content affects enterprises’ UGC operation input decisions.