集体经营性建设用地入市成本及流转增益分配研究
Study on Market Cost and Transfer Gain Allocation of Collective Operational Construction Land
DOI: 10.12677/MSE.2022.114088, PDF,    科研立项经费支持
作者: 刘力玮:黑龙江科技大学管理学院,黑龙江 哈尔滨
关键词: “集地”入市收益分配决策博弈论Collective Construction Land into the Market Income Distribution Decision Game Theory
摘要: “集地”入市是解决农村“三块地”问题的有效途径之一。依托对“集地”入市政策及典型“集地”入市程序梳理,将入市程序分为三个阶段,即准备阶段、部署阶段以及实施阶段。对三个主体的“集地”入市成本构成进行深入分析。同时,针对典型案例构建shapley value模型,对其收益分配进行博弈分析。结果显示:政府收益分配比例在22.14%~28.51%、集体经济组织收益分配比例在36.11%~59.20%、村民收益分配比例在15.29%~41.75%之间。结合实证研究,理论结果与实际分配存在一定的差异性,对收益形成机理与分配关系对差异形成的原因进行深入分析,显示差异主要集中在集体经济组织与村民间的分配关系。同时,“集地”入市后的增益受到多元因素影响,主要包括:土地基本与用途、入市方式、入市成本以及市场供需关系的影响。政府、集体经济组织、村民三者的收益则受到收益形成机理与分配关系的影响。研究结果可以为不同区域“集地”入市收益制定差异化分配标准,实现分配合理科学化。
Abstract: The market of collective construction land is one of the effective ways to solve the problem of “three plots of land” in rural areas. Based on the review of the market policies of collective construction land and the market procedures of typical collective construction land, the market procedures are divided into three stages, namely the preparation stage, the deployment stage and the implementation stage. The composition of market cost of collective construction land of three subjects is analyzed deeply. At the same time, the shapley value model is constructed for typical cases, and its income distribution is analyzed by game analysis. The results show that the proportion of government income distribution is 22.14%~28.51%, the proportion of collective economic organizations income distribution is 36.11%~59.20%, and the proportion of villagers income distribution is 15.29%~41.75%. Based on the empirical study, there are some differences between the theoretical results and the actual distribution; this paper makes an in-depth analysis of the formation mechanism of income and the distribution relationship, and shows that the differences are mainly concentrated in the distribution relationship between collective economic organizations and villagers. At the same time, the gain of collective construction land after market entry is affected by multiple factors, mainly including the basic and use of land, market entry mode, market entry cost and the relationship between market supply and demand. The income of government, collective economic organization and villagers is affected by the income formation mechanism and distribution relationship. The results of this study can establish the differentiated distribution standard for the market income of collective construction land in different regions and realize the rational and scientific distribution.
文章引用:刘力玮. 集体经营性建设用地入市成本及流转增益分配研究[J]. 管理科学与工程, 2022, 11(4): 755-765. https://doi.org/10.12677/MSE.2022.114088

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