演化博弈视角下应收账款融资模式研究

Research on Accounts Receivable Financing Model from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

摘要: 首先将供应链中小企业作为研究对象，以破解中小企业融资难、征信难为切入点，在对供应链金融的信任问题进行研究后，构建了应收账款融资模式下中小企业与核心企业的演化博弈模型。本文通过计算博弈收益矩阵建立复制者动态方程，构建中小企业和核心企业的复制动态方程，解得本模型演化博弈平衡点，并通过构造雅可比矩阵进行博弈稳定性分析，根据稳定性分析结果总结了影响应收账款中小企业与核心企业决策因素，进一步给出了改进意见。

Abstract: Firstly, taking supply chain SMEs as the research object, taking the financing difficulties and credit reporting difficulties of SMEs as the starting point, and after studying the trust problem of supply chain finance, the evolutionary game model between SMEs and core enterprises under the receiva-bles financing model is constructed. This paper establishes the replicator dynamic equation by cal-culating the game income matrix, constructs the replication dynamic equation of SMEs and core enterprises, solves the evolutionary game equilibrium point of the model, and constructs the Jacobi matrix for game stability analysis, summarizes the decision-making factors affecting accounts re-ceivable SMEs and core enterprises according to the stability analysis results, and further gives suggestions for improvement.